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Parents Unwittingly Leak Their Children's Data: A GDPR Time Bomb? 
Abstract. There are many apps available for parents that are designed to help them monitor their 
pregnancy or child’s development. These apps require parents to share information about 
themselves or their children in order to utilise many of the apps’ features.  However, parents remain 
concerned about their children’s privacy, indicating a privacy paradox between concerns and 
actions. The research presented here conducted an analysis of parenting apps alongside a survey of 
parents to determine if their concerns regarding sharing information about their children was at 
odds with their use of parenting apps. 
A survey of 75 parents found that they had strong concerns around the availability of information 
about their children but were using apps within which they shared this information. Parents were 
not giving consideration to the information requested when using apps. This should be of concern to 
developers given the growing awareness of users’ rights in relation to managing their data. 
We propose new guidelines for app developers to better protect children’s privacy and to improve 
trust relationships between developers and users.  
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Introduction 
Jack’s mum shares information about her son's ADHD using a child development tracker and social 
network app. Eight years later she wants to enroll her child in an exclusive private school. 
Unbeknown to her, they search online to find evidence of behavioural issues before they decide 
whether or not to admit him. They find the original posting, and the ensuing discussion where others 
give her behavioural advice. The school decides not to admit her child.  
Pregnancy and the experience of becoming a parent is a life changing event and in this digital age it 
is not surprising that parents look to online resources and mobile applications to provide them with 
information and support during this period (Prior, 2016). Mobile application developers have 
responded to this and there are apps for a large variety of parenting issues from conception to 
pregnancy development, contraction monitors and baby development trackers. Parents are 
becoming used to sharing information about their children before they are even born (Lupton and 
Pedersen, 2016).  
However, by sharing information about their children through these apps, parents are unwittingly 
creating a digital footprint for their child and potentially compromising their child’s privacy. Recent 
breaches in privacy in apps such as Sitter (an app used for hiring babysitters), in which information 
including address, credit card details and information on users’ children were leaked in a data breach 
highlights the potential risks in having this information stored online, even in trustworthy apps. 
(Abel, 2018)  
At the same time parents report being concerned about what information is available about their 
child online (Madden et al., 2012). This research seeks to build on previous work in the area of 
sharing children’s information on social media, and in the security and privacy of mobile health 
  
applications to examine how parents’ views of privacy match with the mobile apps they install and 
use on their phones and the permissions they grant to these apps.  
By better understanding how parents’ concerns may impact on their use of these apps there is the 
potential for designers and developers of parenting apps to reach out to parents by including usable 
security and privacy measures which are clear and straight forward for users. These could be applied 
in similar manner to other HCI guidelines such as accessibility. 
Related Work 
Parenting and Privacy 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in parenting and data privacy within the HCI 
community (Ammari et al., 2015; Moser, Chen and Schoenebeck, 2017).  
Previous work in the field has looked at the information teenagers and children share about 
themselves on social media, and the implications this has on their privacy (Marwick and Boyd, 2014; 
Silva et al., 2017). There has been a growing awareness in recent years, particularly as the digital 
native generation has aged and become parents of young children themselves that parents are 
increasingly sharing private information about their children with online audiences. 
Much of this work has been conducted from a sociological perspective and examined sharenting – a 
term used to describe parents who over share information about their children online. There have 
been concerns over how children of so called “mummy bloggers” (professional bloggers who post 
regularly about parenting and updates on their children) may feel in the future when reading posts 
about themselves (Blum-Ross and Livingstone, 2017; Orton-Johnson, 2017). One large study looking 
at Facebook sharenting was conducted by Marasli et al., (2016) who examined the Facebook profiles 
of 94 parents and looked at the information shared through these profiles about their children. The 
study considered the social implications of this information being shared but also briefly touched on 
the potential for the children to become victims of identity theft. However, hiding this information 
from so called “big data” companies can be a considerable challenge, Vertesei (2014) looked at the 
steps necessary to prevent corporations from discovering a pregnancy and likened the necessary 
steps to being similar to those used by people wishing to commit criminal acts.  
There has also been research into the data theft implications of this information being shared. 
Brosch (2016) examined the Facebook profiles of participants and noted the significant number of 
parents uploading photos of birth certificates or sharing their child’s date of birth. The risks in 
sharing this sort of information was discussed by Minkus et al., (2015) who crawled a large number 
of adult profiles on Facebook for evidence of children in their public profiles and then combined this 
with public records to identify information on the children. Minkus highlights the value of this 
information to a data broker. It is possible that parents are not aware of the dangers in sharing 
information about children online, Steinberg (2017) offers suggestions for protecting children’s 
privacy and suggests that this model could be viewed in a similar manner to the “back to sleep” and 
second hand smoking campaigns of the 1990s and early 2000s. Most of the work done into 
sharenting to date has focussed on social media, however the growing availability of parenting and 
pregnancy apps means that these are increasingly becoming another avenue for parents to share 
information about their children with others. 
Mobile Apps and Privacy 
  
The number of apps available to provide information and guidance on a range of topics beginning at 
ovulation tracking through to pregnancy, childbirth and parenting continues to grow at a rapid rate 
(Lupton, Pedersen and Thomas, 2016). According to market research from 2013, pregnancy apps are 
more popular than fitness apps (Dolan, 2013), and while there has been less research done into this 
recently it is thought that their popularity continues to grow (Haelle, 2018). It is possible that 
parents feel that by searching for information, sharing images and monitoring the development of 
their children they are performing good parenthood (Lupton, Pedersen and Thomas, 2016) and there 
is an increasing awareness that users are sharing a large volume of information through these 
mobile apps. 
There has been interest in the amount of information being shared in mHealth apps (mobile phone 
apps related to health) in general for several years. One concern since health apps began to appear 
was the trustworthiness of the information, however this has now grown into concerns regarding 
the security of users’ health information (Adhikari and Richards, 2014). It has been suggested that 
data breaches in mHealth apps are more common than might have been thought (Adhikari and 
Richards, 2014), and this may be due to a limited understanding of security and privacy in mHealth 
apps and the risks associated with this information being leaked (Dehling et al., 2015). Plachkinova 
et al., (2015) created a taxonomy of mHealth apps in order to investigate their security and privacy 
concerns and suggest that information on privacy should be available in an app’s description so that 
users can read it before downloading. 
It is argued that the rush to produce mHealth apps has led to some aspects of privacy and security 
not being considered (Martínez-Pérez, de la Torre-Díez and López-Coronado, 2014). At the same 
time there appears to be a paradox in that users have high concerns about their privacy online but 
are also willing to trade their personal information freely when they feel there is a benefit to them 
(Wilson and Valacich, 2012). It is still not clear whether this paradox is due to users’ desire for 
instant gratification and is a behavioural mechanism which cannot be altered (Acquisti and Gross, 
2006), or a case of learned helplessness. Learned helplessness describes a situation in which users 
feel that it is inevitable that at some point their data will be compromised and as a result feel there 
is no point in taking privacy protecting actions (Shklovski et al., 2014). 
Research into privacy concerns surrounding parenting apps has been more limited than general 
mHealth apps, however it is now a growing concern. An Australian study found that many women 
using pregnancy apps were not concerned by the privacy of the information shared or the accuracy 
of the information they receive (Lupton and Pedersen, 2016). Lupton (2016) argues that monitoring 
apps related to conception and pregnancy may have been created for the purpose of acquiring data 
for data breaches. There is a risk that by sharing information in order to use apps, parents and their 
children could effectively become recruited as unpaid contributors to the “digital labour workforce” 
(Lupton and Williamson, 2017). 
This study examines the links between the security concerns of parents when considering sharing 
information about their children, and the information they are willing to provide in order to use 
parenting apps. It differs from previous studies such as Lupton and Pedersen’s work (2016) in that it 
is targeted specifically at users of parenting and pregnancy apps and looks at a wider range of 
privacy issues. 
In this study we will investigate the extent to which parents are aware of the interaction between 
data sharing on apps and their privacy and propose the following hypothesis: 
  
H1. Parents are conscious of security and privacy dangers in sharing information about their 
children. 
H2. Parents with privacy and security concerns install, use and grant permissions to apps on their 
mobile phone without considering the security implications. 
H3. Parents do not consider data sharing implications while selecting and installing apps.  
Using these hypothesis, we look to answer the research question, what consideration do parents 
give to security and privacy concerns when installing parenting apps? 
Methodology 
In this present study, we explore the extent to which parents consider the security and privacy 
implications of providing data about themselves and their children in mobile apps and whether this 
influences the decisions they make about installing apps related to pregnancy and parenting. 
A two stage approach was taken within this study. Firstly a poll was conducted with members of 
online parenting groups to discover popular parenting and pregnancy apps. This was combined with 
an analysis of trending Apps for Parents from the App Store.  
The initial poll involved asking members of Parenting Facebook Groups which apps they used, and 
collating those responses. This was then followed by a survey of users of these apps to determine 
the extent to which they consider the security implications when installing apps. 
 
App  App Description (Android Downloads)  
Peanut  Peanut is a social networking app, designed to help mothers connect with, and learn 
from, other mothers in their local area. (50,000).  
Ovia  
Parenting  
Ovla Parenting is designed to help parents keep track of their child’s milestones and 
provides advice on child development and parenting. Parents can use the app to 
share information about their children, including photographs and videos. 
(100,000).  
Mush  Mush is a social networking app, designed to help mothers to meet similar, like 
minded-mothers in their local area. (100,000).  
Baby   
Center  
Babycenter produce a pregnancy tracker and baby development calendar app for 
parents. The app contains parenting advice and tips. (10, 000,000).  
Sprout  Sprout is a pregnancy tracker with some premium content available for a fee, for 
example health information and 3d videos of in-utero foetus development. 
(1,000,000).  
Bounty  
Parenting  
Bounty Parenting is a pregnancy and baby tracking app, with vouchers and free 
samples available for pregnancy and baby related products, and links to UK relevant 
health guides and hospital information packs. (100,000).  
  
Ovia 
Pregnancy  
Ovia lets users track the development of a foetus and provides further advice and 
information on pregnancy and health tracking. (1,000,000).  
Parentune  Parentune is a social networking app for parents, and provides access to parenting 
experts and online advice. (500,000).  
Glow 
 Baby  
Glow Baby is designed to help parents track their baby’s activities, including 
breast/bottle feeds, diaper changes, nap times and duration, medication, and record 
milestones. (100,000).  
Glow   
Nurture  
Glow Nuture is a pregnancy tracker, designed for expectant parents to track the 
growth of the foetus and provide advice on pregnancy related health matters. 
(500,000).  
What to 
Expect  
What to Expect is a pregnancy and baby tracking app to help parents keep track 
of foetal development and record their baby’s milestones. (1,000,000).  
Table 1. Apps Selected for Study 
 
App Analysis 
Eleven of the most popular parenting apps were selected for this study. These apps were then 
further analysed to ascertain which data types the apps requested during registration, and to review 
the terms and conditions of these apps. All of the apps were available through Google Play or the 
Apple Store. 
The identified apps are shown in Table 1, along with a description of the purpose of the app. 
We installed these apps onto our own personal mobile devices (one Android and one iOS), and 
logged the data that each app requested during the registration process. Table 2 shows the data that 
each app requested from the user. 
Data Collected by Apps.  
It is evident from Table 2, that there is a very broad range of data collected by the various apps. 
Some of the data requested relates exclusively to the user, for example name, email address and 
photo, while other data types relate to the user’s child(ren), for example child’s date of birth, child’s 
medical history, and child’s place of birth. To appreciate the sensitivity of the different data types, 
we further categorised the data depending on the longevity of the data. For each data type stored 
by the app, we categorised the data type depending on whether the data was static (i.e. would not 
change during the course of the owner’s lifetime), flexible (may change over time) or dynamic (likely 
to change frequently). If there was a data breach, static and flexible data will be of more value in 
constructing a further attack on a victim, as the data is more likely to be accurate and useful in 
generating an attack hook that could appear authentic to the victim. In Table 2, the static data types 
have been coloured red, flexible as orange and dynamic as green. Some of the data could be 
considered publicly available, (e.g. if the data is already available in the public domain, e.g. from 
websites such as 192.com), while others would be considered private. For each of the data types, 
those considered private (i.e. not generally shared online or via social media) are denoted by (P). 
  
Some of this information is considered private by certain organisations, and used to confirm identity 
(e.g. date of birth, place of birth). 
Privacy Threats from Apps.  
Privacy threats relating to the use of parenting apps include: a breach of user confidentiality, failure 
to protect the data, and client or server end bugs that could lead to a security breach. Given the 
sensitivity of some of the data collected, it is important that users are fully aware of what data is 
being collected, how and where it is being stored, and how the data is going to be used. We 
reviewed the Privacy Policies of each of the apps, to ascertain where data was stored and how it was 
used. Typically, the paid apps had the best level of privacy protection, where the user’s data was 
generally stored only on the user’s phone. This would ensure that a breach of the organisation’s 
infrastructure would not lead to compromisation of the user’s data, and the data was not being 
passed to third parties for marketing purposes.  
Any threats to the user’s privacy from these types of apps is limited to app security on the device 
itself, and the ease with which malicious apps installed on the device may be able to access the data 
on the device. The free apps stated various levels of data sharing within their privacy policies, with 
all of them requesting permission to store user data on the organisation’s servers, with that data 
being passed to third parties for marketing purposes. Typically, the social media apps required the 
user to agree to share their data with other users. 
Based on the information that is stored by these apps, a list of potential attacks that could be 
conducted using this information was compiled. A description of these potential attacks and how 
information could be used to help orchestrate such an attack is described below: 
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Your name  X  X  X  X     X  X  X  X  X     
Your child’s name  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X     X  
Current location (P)  X  X  X                          
Address  X  X  X        X                 
Email Address  X  X  X  X     X  X  X  X  X  X  
Phone number (P)                       X           
  
Your Photo X  X  X  X     X  X  X  X  X     
Your child’s photo  X  X  X  X     X        X        
Your date of birth     X  X        X     X           
Child’s date of birth  X  X  X  X     X  X  X  X  X  X  
Your child’s due date (P)        X  X     X  X  X  X  X  X  
Your contacts (P)                       X           
Your social media profiles  X  X  X           X  X           
Your medical history (P)                    X        X  X  
Your child’s medical 
history (P)  
   X              X     X  X     
Your child’s place of birth 
(P)  
               X  X              
Table 2.  – App Analysis 
 
Spear phishing is an email spoofing attack that targets a specific user or organisation, using 
information that has been harvested to make the email look more authentic. Spear phishing emails 
are generally designed to gain unauthorised access to sensitive information, either by persuading 
the user to click on a link in the email or open a malicious attachment. If someone’s email address 
was leaked from a parenting app, along with other personal information, this information could be 
used to construct an authentic looking spear phishing attack.  
Identity fraud can occur if personal information has been stolen, for example following a breach of 
user confidentiality. Information such as name, address, date of birth can be used to gain access to 
existing accounts, or used to obtain goods or services by impersonating the user to open new 
accounts.  
If a user’s details are breached, this information could be used to construct a password guessing 
attack, or reset a user’s password if ‘security questions’ can be guessed. If a user’s password hash 
has been stolen, user’s details could be used to generate a password dictionary, unique to that 
particular user that could be used to then orchestrate a hybrid password attack. 
It would be relatively easy for someone who was seeking access to children, or vulnerable mothers, 
to use the apps to gain access to this demographic for grooming purposes.  
App Reviews 
The reviews of the apps in Table 1 which were posted in both the Google Play and Apple App stores 
were examined for any mention of privacy or security. Over 500 reviews were examined, eleven 
reviews were related to security or privacy, these were spread across seven apps.  
Three reviews mentioned issues in deleting data, either users could not work out how to delete their 
data, or having thought they deleted it they discovered that it was still stored by the app provider. 
  
Four reviews expressed concern over the amount of data which was being collected, these reviews 
related to two apps. While many reviews revealed users’ frustration at being forced to create a 
Facebook account to log into some apps only one review related this back to a concern around their 
personal privacy. Of the remaining three reviews, one raised concern around the other users of the 
app and how they were vetted, one commented that it was not easy to change the privacy settings 
of photos stored on the app and the remaining review stated that they liked not having to give 
special privacy permissions to install the app.  
Survey 
Following analysis of the parenting apps selected for the study, we conducted a survey of parents 
who used parenting apps to determine what consideration they gave to security concerns when 
using the apps.  
Participants and Design 
An online survey was used to gather parents’ views on security, privacy and app use. The use of an 
online survey enabled us to reach a wider geographical area than would have been possible through 
other methods. The survey questions were trialled with seven participants prior to validate the 
survey and ensure there were no barriers to survey completion. The survey was designed to be 
completed in under ten minutes. 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited to the survey over the period of one month between April and May 
2018. Recruitment took place through a variety of online mediums including Twitter, Facebook 
groups targeted at parents and parenting websites (such as NetMums and BabyCentre). We were 
aware that some parents who used parenting apps may not use social media and so leaflets about 
the study were put in playgroups, parenting cafes and children’s recreation centres in the local area. 
 
Following the informed consent process there were four sections to this survey. 
Demographics 
Participants were asked for their age, gender, level of education, if they had children, if they used 
parenting apps and their country of residence. If participants selected no to either having children or 
using parenting apps they were excluded from the study. As the survey was examining the amount 
of personal information which participants are willing to share we deliberately avoided asking for 
information by means of which participants could be identified. This meant that the demographic 
information elicited was limited but still ensured that any themes in participant groups could be 
identified. 
Use of Apps 
Before participants were asked about their privacy concerns they were asked to identify which of 
the apps in Table 2 they used. There were eleven apps available for them to select and the option of 
none of the above.  
Privacy Concerns 
  
The questions on privacy concerns were separated into two sections. The first section asked 
questions relating to general attitudes to security and privacy on a five point Likert scale ranging 
from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
The second section looked specifically at the information participants were willing to share in order 
to use an app. The following information asked for by the apps were listed and participants rated on 
a five point Likert scale their level of comfortableness with sharing this information, ranging from 
Very Uncomfortable to Very Comfortable.  
Reaction to Apps 
The final stage of the survey revealed a grid which presented the types of information stored by 
each of the apps. Once participants had examined this grid they were asked whether they were 
comfortable or uncomfortable with this information being collected. Depending on their answer 
they were then directed either to a question asking why they felt comfortable sharing this 
information or to a question asking them given they were uncomfortable with this what they were 
likely to do with these apps in the future. 
Ethical consent was sought and obtained by the authors’ institution prior to the commencement of 
the survey. The survey asked for no identifiable information and provided details at the end on 
websites which could provide participants with further information on keeping their data private if 
they wished. 
 
Variable Name % (n) 
Age 
18-25 
26-35 
36-45 
46-55 
 
9.33 (7) 
60 (45) 
29.33 (22) 
1.33 (1) 
Country 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Australia 
Singapore 
Ukraine 
  
89.33 (67) 
6.67 (5) 
1.33 (1) 
1.33 (1) 
1.33 (1) 
 
Education 
Did not complete HS 
  
2.66 (2) 
  
Completed HS 
Some higher education 
Undergraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Degree 
PhD 
  
12 (9) 
30.67 (23) 
50.67 (38) 
32 (24) 
1.67 (5) 
Table 3. – Participant Demographics 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
During the month that the survey was available 101 participants began the study, 26 were excluded 
because they were either not parents or did not use parenting apps. In total 75 participants 
completed the survey. Of those participants 97% (n=73) were female. Participants were composed 
predominantly of the millennial generation, the majority of participants were aged between 26 and 
35 see Table 3. 
The participants were mainly from the United Kingdom with the remainder coming from USA, 
Australia, Singapore and Ukraine.  Participants had a variety of educational experiences ranging from 
not completing high school to having a PhD . The majority of participants had at least an 
undergraduate degree. All participants in the study had used at least one app with the average being 
2.6 (sd = 1.6).  The most popular app used was Baby Center (52%, n=39). 
Levels of concern 
When asked how concerned they were about the data being collected and shared about themselves 
and their children, the participants were above neutral in their level of concern for every category - 
see Table 4. Participants were more concerned about the data being gathered about their children 
than they were about themselves. The highest average level of concern related to information being 
collected about children for advertising purposes (n=4.04), followed closely by concerns around who 
could see information about their children (n=4). When considering information being shared about 
their children, only three participants (4%) were completely unconcerned with the volume of 
information stored about their children online, and with whom could see it. One participant (1.33%) 
was completely unconcerned about the information stored about their child for marketing purposes. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. - Participants Concerns Regarding Sharing Information 
Levels of comfort 
The examination of the information participants would be comfortable sharing revealed that there 
were only two categories of information in which participants on average rated feeling comfortable 
or very comfortable in sharing, these were their own name (n=3.45) and their email address 
(n=3.45). By contrast the average level of comfort for their child’s name was 2.56. Participants were 
least comfortable in sharing their child’s medical history (n=1.56), followed closely by their own 
medical history (n=1.6). The median for both these forms of data was 1.  
Continued Use of Apps 
Having been presented with the information regarding what information is stored by the apps, the 
participants were asked if they were happy to continue using the app, 81.3% of participants (n=61) 
were not happy. 
Participants who were unhappy were asked about their future plans for use of these apps and the 
majority (65%, n=39) said that they would consider altering the settings on the apps. Only two 
participants (3.3%) planned to continue using the app as before and 31.7% (n=19) would consider 
deleting the app. 
  
 
Fig. 2. – Participants Level of Comfort 
The participants who were happy with the information being stored on the app were asked for the 
reason behind this. For the majority (78.6%, n=11) this was because they trusted the app providers 
to use the data appropriately, while the remaining three participants (21.4%) were not concerned 
about how this data was used. 
By splitting the participants into two groups it is possible to examine any differences between them 
in their levels of concerns around issues about their data being shared and in their degrees of 
comfort in sharing specific forms of information. 
In both cases the data was normally distributed and application of the MannWhitney U test shows 
that participants who were unhappy with the data being stored on the apps had reported higher 
levels of concerns around data sharing issues than the participants who were happy with the data 
stored on the apps (z=3.01, p=0.003). However there was no significant difference between their 
levels of comfort in sharing specific items of information (p=0.14).  
Discussion 
H1. Parent’s consciousness of security and privacy dangers 
Parents in the study on average were concerned about the information stored about them and their 
children. Areas of particular concern were who could have access to this information and how this 
information could be used for marketing purposes. This suggests they are conscious of the dangers 
in sharing information about their children.  
H2. Installation and Use of Apps 
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(1 = Very Uncomfortable, 5 = Very Comfortable)
All Participant Uncomfortable With Apps Having Information
Comfortable With Apps Having Information
  
There were no significant differences in the amount of information parents with high security 
concerns were potentially sharing through apps compared to those with lower security concerns. 
This indicates that despite having privacy and security concerns, parents are installing apps which 
request large amounts of information. It should be noted that this study did not specifically ask what 
information was being shared, but from our analysis of the apps we can conclude that this 
information would be required in order to use the app effectively.  
H3. Sharing of Information 
When participants were shown the amount of information that could be stored by the different apps 
they were using, 81.3% (n=61) they stated that they were uncomfortable with this and of these the 
majority (n=39, 65%) would be looking to change the settings on these apps. This indicates that 
parents are installing apps which request information about their children and are not taking on 
board that they are sharing information in doing this.  
The results suggest that although the majority of parents are concerned by online security and 
privacy issues surrounding their children, they give little to no consideration to this when installing 
mobile parenting apps.  
Hypothesis Supported/Not 
Supported 
H1. Parents are conscious of security and privacy dangers in sharing 
information about their children. 
Supported 
H2. Parents with privacy and security concerns install, use and grant 
permissions to apps on their mobile phone without considering the 
security implications. 
Supported 
H3. Parents are not conscious of the information they are sharing on apps.  Supported 
Table 4. Hypothesis 
Parents Views and Actions 
Parents in the study reported being highly concerned about the information being shared about 
themselves and their children and uncomfortable with many types of information being shared. 
However, this appeared to be in contrast with their behaviour of using many apps which stored 
personal information on them. This privacy paradox has been noted in previous studies (Norberg, 
Horne and Horne, 2007), in which it has been noted that despite their disclosed intentions users 
frequently share personal data. Much of this previous work has looked at social media however, as 
this study has shown, this behaviour can also be found in the use of apps. This study’s results are in 
contrast to those found in Lupton and Pedersen’s work (2016) which found participants were not 
overly concerned with the data being stored or used by parenting apps.  
One potential reason why this contrast can be seen so clearly in this study could have been due to 
stories in the media during the time period the survey was available. The Cambridge 
Analytica/Facebook scandal was first covered in the press in the UK in March 2018, shortly before 
  
we deployed this survey and during the study was being discussed at on many popular parenting 
websites (babycentre, 2018; Mumsnet, 2018). The heightened awareness is often that users’ data is 
a commodity may have explained this difference.    
Guidelines for Developers 
Those participants who responded that they were unhappy with the apps having their information 
indicated that they were likely to have been unaware of the amount of information being stored 
before the survey – only 3.3% would continue to use the apps with no changes. As pointed out by 
some commentators, by raising awareness of how data is processed there is the opportunity to build 
trust between app providers and their users. If user awareness in this area continues to rise then app 
providers may find themselves at risk of losing users if this trust is not present. Parental app 
providers could be at an additional risk, as this study shows parents are more guarded about their 
child’s data than their own.  
There are existing guidelines for developers regarding how much data they should request from and 
store about users. However, what our study suggests is that parents are particularly concerned 
about the amount of information being stored on their children and that should they become aware 
of this it may impact upon their use of the app. 
We suggest that in addition to complying with current data legislation and only storing the minimum 
required amount of information, developers of parenting apps should work with parents to 
determine the levels of information they are comfortable in sharing with specific applications. 
Developers should also give consideration as to how they present the terms and conditions of their 
apps. If parents feel confident that they understand the digital footprint they are creating for their 
child then there is the possibility that they may be more inclined to continue to use the app.  
In addition there may be benefits in allowing parents to use the apps without providing specific 
information about their child. For example will it affect the advice given by the app if they don’t 
provide their child’s gender or exact date of birth. Consider if there are less identifying ways to 
gather this data such as the child’s age, could an icon be used instead of a photo of their child? 
Developers should give consideration to these issues when designing parenting apps.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations within this survey. Firstly by asking adults to self report on their 
concerns around data privacy there is the risk of a social desirability bias, we were not able to 
validate how accurate this reporting was. Secondly we did not investigate if parents who are 
concerned about the data being stored are actually sharing their child’s data or using dummy data.  
When asking participants about their comfort in sharing specific pieces of information this was on a 
very general form, there would be benefit in future studies examining in which situations they would 
be comfortable sharing these different pieces of information.  
Finally we have not been able to follow up on the study to determine if the participants took any 
action after discovering the amount of data they were sharing.  
Conclusion and Future work 
There has been a large growth in recent years in pregnancy and parenting apps, and data on parents 
is of interest to many corporations. At the same time parents are becoming increasingly concerned 
  
with what data is available online about their children and who can access this. This study has shown 
that despite these concerns many parents are using apps which store this information and have not 
given consideration as to who may have access to this information. 
This survey showed that despite being unhappy with the information stored by app providers, the 
majority of participants were still planning to continue using the apps. However of those who were 
planning to continue using the apps, many would look to alter the settings on the apps, it should be 
noted that this is behavioural intention and it is not clear if it became actual behaviour.   
Future studies should investigate if after being informed about the data stored by apps, participants 
make any changes to the settings on apps or the information, and if this has been influenced by the 
recent press stories regarding the commoditization of data. It would also be beneficial to work with 
parents who are non-users to discover any privacy concerns that have stopped them from using 
these apps.  
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